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Financial Integration, Investor Protection and Imbalanced Optimistically Biased 
Information Timeliness in Emerging Markets 
 
Abstract 
Principal-principal conflicts in many emerging markets can lead to an optimistically 
biased information environment. Using 24 emerging markets during the period 1996-
2016, this paper examines how market-level, firm-level financial integration and investor 
protection quality jointly affect Imbalanced Optimistically Biased Information 
Timeliness (IOBIT). Results show that financial integration and investor protection 
quality affect good and bad information timeliness asymmetrically. Market-level 
financial integration augments IOBIT while firm-level financial integration and investor 
protection mitigate IOBIT. The effect of firm-level financial integration in mitigating 
IOBIT is reduced when market-level financial integration increases and/or investor 
protection becomes stronger. Our analysis enhances our understanding of the benefit-cost 
trade-off associated with financial integration in affecting information timeliness and the 
conditional factors in altering this benefit-cost trade-off in emerging markets.  
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Balanced information timeliness is crucial for stock market efficiency and 
investor protection. It reflects not only the balanced amount of good and bad forward-
looking, value-relevant information, but also the balanced timely manner of these to be 
communicated to market participants and then incorporated into price (Beekes et al., 
2014, 2016)1. It is the result of the joint efforts of managers and market participants in 
forward-looking information collection, communication and verification, which 
complement financial statements and inform investors about the firm prospectus 
(Feldman et al., 2010; Merkley, 2014).  
However, agency conflicts lead to an optimistically biased information 
environment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 Kothari et al., 2009), especially in terms of 
forward-looking information because it is qualitative in nature, non-time specific, and 
difficult to verify2 (Schleicher & Walker, 2010). In many emerging markets (EM), share 
prices are quite often inflated (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Khurana et al., 2013; Zhang et 
al., 2013, 2015, 2017; Ang & Ma, 2001), suggesting information timeliness in many 
emerging markets is biased towards good, relative to bad, i.e. Imbalanced Optimistically 
Biased Information Timeliness (IOBIT). Given this background, we know little about the 
impacts of financial integration on agency conflicts in general, and in particular on 
IOBIT. This paper fills the conceptual and empirical gaps by examining how market-
level and firm-level financial integration and investor protection quality jointly affect 
IOBIT in emerging markets.  
                                                          
1 Forward-looking information can be communicated with investors via many forms of voluntary disclosure 
such as conference calls, earnings warnings and narrative reporting in annual reports (Feldman et al., 2010; 
Merkley, 2014). 
2 Indeed, International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) concerns on forward-looking information 
credibility, which may add noise so as to “make the more important information difficult to find” (IFRS, 
2010, P. 12). 
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The elimination of market-level investment barriers by policy makers and 
regulators, and firm-level investment barriers by controlling shareholders take place 
independently in many emerging markets (Harvey, 1995; Kang & Stulz, 1997; Mitton, 
2006; Claessens & Schmuckler, 2007; Li et al., 2015). When market-level investment 
barriers are eliminated by policy makers, firm-level investment barriers can be 
maintained by controlling shareholders to protect their own private benefits, which 
further stimulates foreign investor’s home bias problems3. In contrast, when market-level 
investment barriers are maintained by policy makers and regulators, firm-level 
investment barriers can be eliminated by controlling shareholders if they actively engage 
in global asset and information connections to delink their firms from their sovereign and 
country risks (Lee et al., 2016). Given these decisions are independent, a firm from an 
emerging market can therefore choose not to engage, to engage with either market- level 
or firm- level financial integration, or to engage with both. Based on this independence, 
we argue that principal-principal conflicts and IOBIT may increase, as the cost of 
market-level financial integration, if the global information asymmetry between large 
and minority shareholders is enlarged in an EM country by market-level financial 
integration. In contrast, firm-level financial integration may mitigate the information 
asymmetry between large and minority shareholders within the firm and thus bring 
benefits in mitigating principal-principal conflicts and IOBIT.  
Our study focuses on emerging markets for two reasons. First, an imbalanced and 
optimistically biased information environment can be corrected in advanced markets 
where institutional environments are strong and sophisticated market participants drive 
                                                          
3 First, many emerging market firms engage in financial integration at market level but do not eliminate firm-
level investment barriers (Mitton, 2006; Li et al., 2015). Second, there is equity home bias, whereby foreign 
investors only hold modest amounts of foreign equity assets (Harvey, 1995; Zhang et al., 2017), even when 
there are no regulation restrictions on cross-border asset holding (Kang & Stulz, 1997). 
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stock prices to fundamentals through informed trading, dependent on corporate 
managerial actions (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans & Manso, 2011; Ferreira et al., 
2011; Beekes et al., 2016). In contrast, many emerging markets are more likely to suffer 
poor information timeliness and serious IOBIT due to the weak institutional 
environment, poor disclosure quality and lack of sophisticated market participants, 
coupled with less effective informed trading (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015; 
2017). Thus the potential benefit-cost trade-off on information timeliness associated with 
financial integration is amplified in emerging markets. Second, globalization has 
increased significantly during the last decade, leading to greater capital flows into 
emerging markets (Liu et al., 2014) and increased financial integration of emerging 
markets with advanced markets. However, the benefits and costs of financial integration 
to emerging markets are under debate. On one hand, financial integration is expected to 
import foreign sophisticated market participants into emerging markets, improve 
informed trading and strengthen market discipline over management (Aggarwal et al., 
2011; Bae & Goyal, 2010; Lucey & Zhang, 2011; Huang & Zhu, 2015). On the other 
hand, financial integration is accused of triggering a series of price volatility and 
financial crises in emerging stock markets (Li et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2015; Dvokak, 
2005).  
Our contributions to financial integration and corporate governance literature are 
threefold. First, we focus on the benefit-cost trade-off associated with financial 
integration in affecting optimistically biased information timeliness in emerging markets. 
Our analysis helps to understand how market-level and firm-level financial integration 
differently affect the outcome of forward-looking information collection, communication 
and verification between managers and market participants. By revealing the different 
impacts of market-level and firm-level financial integration on IOBIT, our analysis helps 
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to explain the mixed results on the benefit-cost trade-off associated with financial 
integration documented in the literature. The different impacts on IOBIT associated with 
market-level and firm-level financial integration also suggests that agency problems may 
be the reason that market-level financial integration does not necessarily lead to firm-
level financial integration, extending Bekaert et al. (2011).  
Second, we contribute to corporate governance literature on optimal bundles of 
governance mechanisms in mitigating agency costs (Aslan & Kumar, 2014) by revealing 
that firm-level, market-level financial integration and investor protection standard work 
as substitutive governance bundles in mitigating principal-principal conflicts and IOBIT. 
Our results show that high levels of market-level financial integration and investor 
protection quality weaken the impacts of firm-level financial integration in mitigating 
IOBIT in emerging markets. The implications for policy makers are provided and 
discussed in our research.  
Finally, financial integration and corporate governance reform are an important 
agenda in many emerging markets to improve investor confidence and promote stock 
market development. By focusing on 24 emerging markets from 1996-2016, we extend 
previous research from advanced markets into those where IOBIT largely remains 
uncorrected and firms have very different motivations to engage with market- or firm-
level financial integration.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
most closely related literature and formulate our predictions. Section 3 describes the data 
and variables and Section 4 presents the results. Concluding remarks are made in Section 
5. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
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2.1. Principal-principal agency problems, financial integration, and information 
timeliness in emerging markets 
In many emerging markets, share ownership is often concentrated into large shareholders 
so that they have the power and incentive to mitigate the classic principal–agent conflicts 
in weak institutional environments (Claessens & Fan, 2002). However, powerful 
shareholders in weak institutional environments also have strong incentives to extract 
private benefits at the cost of uninformed minority investors, stimulating principal–
principal conflicts (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Zhang et al., 2015). 
In the presence of the principal-principal conflicts, large shareholders have incentives to 
keep the information environment of their firm opaque and optimistically biased (Zhang 
et al., 2013, 2015; Khurana et al., 2013; Kothari et al., 2009). Thus, minority 
shareholders suffer from the presence of large controlling shareholders (Claessens & 
Fan, 2002).  
 Many firms from emerging markets engage in market-level financial integration 
without elimination of firm-level investment barriers (Mitton, 2006; Li et al., 2015). 
Market-level financial integration brings benefits to emerging markets such as reduced 
cost of capital (Bekaert & Harvey, 2000), increased real investment (Mitton, 2006; Chari 
& Henry, 2008) and enhanced productivity and growth (Bekaert et al., 2005). With the 
opportunities of market openness, large shareholders may have strong incentives to reap 
these benefits in order to boost their share price and concentrate wealth in the company 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002; Zhang et al., 2013).  
However, principal-principal conflicts provide strong incentives for large 
shareholders (and their controlled managers) to abuse their advantages of accessing 
global information over minority shareholders arising from their power to decide 
whether, when, and how their controlled firms engage in market-level financial 
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integration. Thus the benefits related to market-level financial integration may be 
covered by imbalanced disclosure and tunnelled away into large shareholders’ own 
private benefits, leading to an optimistically biased information environment (Ang & Ma, 
2001; Kothari et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013; 2017; Ferreira et al., 2011). Consequently, 
a large amount of good global forward-looking information related to the benefits of 
market-level financial integration can be signalled and incorporated to market in a more 
timely manner, but bad global forward-looking information related to large shareholders’ 
private benefit extractions can be delayed or even suppressed from the market (Kothari et 
al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013; 2017).  
Based on the analysis above, we expect that market-level financial integration 
increases IOBIT in emerging markets. It is not clear though, whether, or not, market-
level financial integration affects aggregate information timeliness, which depends on the 
net outcome between good and bad information timeliness. Specifically, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Market-level financial integration does not affect aggregate information 
timeliness in emerging markets. 
H2: Market-level financial integration increases imbalanced optimistically 
biased information timeliness in emerging markets.  
 
Firm-level financial integration, by importing sophisticated foreign market 
participants into firm-level monitoring and disciplining over management, can mitigate 
the global information advantages associated with large shareholders over minority 
shareholders (Albuquerque et al., 2009; Dvokak, 2005). In comparison to domestic 
counterparts in emerging economies, foreign investors are more experienced and 
sophisticated (Ng & Wu, 2007), less subject to political pressures and better informed in 
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terms of global information (Kim & Yi, 2015). Thus they are more capable of 
influencing financial reporting practices (Fang et al., 2015) and more likely to discipline 
management due to their informed status and independent role (Bae et al., 2012; Huang 
& Zhu, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017). Following their investments, sophisticated foreign 
market participants are found to be able to continue to shape investee firms’ voluntary 
disclosure (Tsang et al., 2019), which is an important mechanism in forward-looking 
information communication. Therefore, firm-level financial integration should be able to 
affect the outcome of global forward-looking information collection, communication and 
verification between managers and market participants. 
 Financial integration at firm-level makes emerging market firms directly 
communicate with foreign shareholders, placing large controlling shareholders and 
managers under the direct scrutiny of these foreign shareholders. The direct scrutiny of 
foreign shareholders over good forward-looking information strengthens the verification 
process until this become credible. This further verification process prevents un-reliable 
good forward-looking information from being incorporated into price by unsophisticated 
market participants, and ultimately reduces the information timeliness for good forward-
looking information.  
On the other hand, large shareholders face high threat of legal or regulatory 
penalties in delaying or suppressing bad forward-looking information, especially for 
those cross-listing their shares in advanced markets and invested by foreign investors 
from countries with strong investor protection standards (Baker et al., 2002; Watts, 2003; 
Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). In addition, foreign investors with their 
informed status and independent role, will engage in pre-emptive trading when they 
detect any suppressed or delayed bad forward-looking information related to market-
level financial integration (Lang et al., 2003; Gul et al., 2010; Admati & Pfleiderer, 
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2000). Such pre-emptive trading by foreign investors on bad forward-looking 
information in order to protect their own investment ultimately speeds up the information 
timeliness for bad forward-looking information which controlling shareholders have 
strong incentives to suppress from the market. 
Based on the analysis above, we expect that firm-level financial integration 
directly mitigates IOBIT in emerging markets. It is not clear, however, whether, or not, 
firm-level financial integration affects aggregate information timeliness. This depends on 
whether and how the impacts of good and bad information timeliness are offset by each 
other. 
In addition, the effects of firm-level financial integration on imbalanced 
optimistically biased information timeliness can be various, conditional on the incentives 
of foreign investors in disciplining large shareholders. Such incentives will be affected 
by benefit and cost associated with disciplining activities conducted by foreign investors. 
On one hand, the benefits of market participants in disciplining large shareholders can 
increase with the threat of exploitation by large shareholders (Bae & Goyal, 2010; Zhang 
et al., 2015, 2017). For example, Covrig et al. (2007) show that in countries following 
International Accounting Standards, foreign mutual fund holdings have stronger interests 
in investing in firms with poorer information environments and with lower visibility. On 
the other hand, the information and monitoring costs to foreign investors increase in an 
opaque information environment, which may reduce their incentives in disciplining 
activities (Ayers et al., 2011).  
As argued earlier, high market-level financial integration potentially stimulates 
principal-principal conflicts by augmenting global information asymmetries between 
large and minority shareholders. Therefore, to protect their investments, the incentives of 
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foreign shareholders in monitoring and disciplining large shareholders may be stronger in 
countries with high levels of financial integration at market level.  
However, the monitoring costs in mitigating the global information asymmetries 
between large and minority shareholders become higher for foreign investors when 
global information asymmetries are augmented by increased market-level financial 
integration. This is because there is much more information to be collected, produced, 
and verified and this is further complicated by the geographic separation from investee 
firms, differences in language, culture, legal and regulatory environments, and 
accounting standards (Baik et al., 2013). Therefore, high market-level financial 
integration can potentially weaken foreign investors’ monitoring incentives. We argue 
that in emerging markets with increasing market-level financial integration, the 
increasing costs for foreign investors to mitigate global information asymmetries can be 
the dominating factor in shaping their incentives to discipline controlling shareholders. 
Specifically, we test the following hypotheses: 
H3: Firm-level financial integration does not affect aggregate information 
timeliness in emerging markets.  
H4: Firm-level financial integration mitigates imbalanced optimistically biased 
information timeliness in emerging markets.  
H5: Firm-level financial integration has smaller impacts in mitigating the 
imbalanced optimistically biased information timeliness when market-level financial 
integration increases in emerging markets.  
 
2.2. Investor protection standards, financial integration, and information timeliness in 
emerging markets 
Strong investor protection helps to ‘level the field’ by imposing high legal and 
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regulatory standards on firm information disclosure (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000; Leuz 
et al., 2003; Aslan & Kumar, 2014), especially on forward-looking information 
disclosure areas (Baginski et al., 2002) due to their credibility issues (Schleicher & 
Walker, 2010). To protect investors from being misled by good forward-looking 
information, strong investor protection standards can hold managerial disclosure until to 
a stricter time frame allowing information verification and ensuring its credibility. It 
also strengthens the threat of legal or regulatory penalties for failure to report, 
immediately, bad information, even though the information may be still forward-
looking in nature. Thus strong investor protection standards are expected to mitigate 
IOBIT.  
Given both strong investor protection standards and firm-level financial 
integration are expected to correct the imbalanced optimistically biased information 
timeliness, it is not clear investor protection quality and firm-level financial integration, 
as the two discipline mechanisms, are complementary to, or substitutive with, each other 
in mitigating global information asymmetry related agency problems. Both investor 
protection policy and foreign investors have the shared aims to discipline large 
shareholders and protect investor interests, foreign investors may have stronger grounds 
and incentives to secure monitoring benefits in countries with stronger investor protection 
standards, i.e., a potential complementary relationship between them (Lucey & Zhang, 
2011).  
However, the incentives of foreign investors in disciplining activities and 
mitigating global information asymmetries can decrease when investor protection quality 
reduces large shareholders’ incentives in maintaining global information asymmetries 
and minor shareholders have improved access to global information. This reduces the 
global information advantages of foreign investors over domestic investors, who now 
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benefit from their closeness with large shareholders in geographic, cultural, language and 
institutional backgrounds to process, verify and trade upon this information (Baik et al., 
2013). Thus strong investor protection reduces the demand on foreign sophisticated 
participants to provide their costly monitoring service to domestic minority investors. 
Ultimately, foreign investors by losing their global information advantages over domestic 
counterparts, have reduced benefits to discipline large shareholders and ultimately, have 
reduced incentives to mitigate global information asymmetry related agency problems. If 
the reduced benefits of, rather than the stronger grounds provided to foreign investors in 
mitigating global information asymmetries, are the dominating factor in shaping their 
incentives to discipline controlling shareholders, we expect firm-level financial 
integration and investor protection policy are substitutive with each other in affecting 
IOBIT. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses:  
H6: Investor protection standards do not affect aggregate information timeliness 
in emerging markets.  
H7: Investor protection standards mitigate imbalanced optimistically biased 
information timeliness in emerging markets.  
H8: Investor protection quality weakens the impacts of firm-level financial 
integration in mitigating the imbalanced optimistically biased information timeliness in 
emerging markets.  
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our sample is from 24 emerging markets during the period 1996 to 2016. To 
reduce survivorship bias, we include companies delisted during the sample period. We 
exclude firms with missing data. We also exclude financial firms (SICs between 6011 
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and 6799) due to their unique accounting and financial characteristics. The selection 
process results in a final sample of 110,583 firm-year observations. We obtain share 
price and financial data from Datastream and Worldscope. Data for market-level 
financial integration measurement is from Chinn and Ito (2006), Federal Reserve 
Economic Data and Thomson Reuters Eikon. Data for firm-level financial integration 
measurement is from Bank of New York Mellon and Thomson Reuters Eikon. Data for 
investor protection standards and other country-level financial and macroeconomic 
variables is from World Bank (World Bank, 2013).  
 
3.2. Measuring information timeliness 
The measure of information timeliness (IT) is derived from Beekes and Brown’s 
(2006) approach who employ a novel intra-year timeliness metric, in the spirit of Ball 
and Brown (1968) and Alford et al. (1993). That is the timeliness with which a firm’s 
share price reflects the net effect of all value-relevant information impounded by all 
market participants in share price over the year, i.e. the intra-year timeliness (Beekes & 
Brown, 2006). Ball and Brown’s measure assesses how accurately a firm’s share price 
(Pt), observed at daily intervals throughout the year, approximates its terminal value (P0). 
Thus this information timeliness measurement metric simultaneously captures the 
amount of forward-looking information and the timely manner of this information to be 
incorporated into price throughout the year.  
In line with earlier literature we define P0 to be the market’s valuation two weeks 
(14 calendar days) after the annual earnings release date. Specifically, we calculate the 
information timeliness (IT) as 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = (∑ |ln(𝑃𝑃0) − ln(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)|)/365𝑡𝑡=−1𝑡𝑡=−365                                                                          (1) 
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where Pt is the market-adjusted share price, which is observed at daily intervals 
from day -365 until day -1, and P0 is the price 14 days after the release date4. 
Because idiosyncratic volatility inflates the IT measure when it is calculated at the 
individual firm-year level, following Beekes and Brown (2006) we also generate a metric 
for information timeliness deflated version (ITD), which is the timeliness metric divided 
by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the 365-day period used to 
calculate the share’s timeliness metric. The longer it takes a firm’s share price to capture 
information and converge to its “final” price P0 (which reflects all forward-looking 
value-relevant information discovered during the year), the larger is the value of IT. A 
high value for IT thus indicates low intra-year timeliness. In contrast, if all the 
information that affects the final price was incorporated on day -365, IT would be at its 
minimum and the speed of price adjustment at its maximum (i.e. most timely 
information). We can interpret IT as a measure of how much forward-looking value-
relevant information is, on the average day, already incorporated into the price before 
prices finally ‘settle’ following the release of the firm’s annual earnings number. 
We use the approach discussed in Beekes and Brown (2006) to calculate two 
additional measures of timeliness: information timeliness of good news (ITG), and 
information timeliness of bad news (ITB). For the timeliness of good information, we 
first identify the third quartile of the share’s raw (unadjusted) daily log returns, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, that 
are positive. Then we construct a market-adjusted daily log return series, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺 ≥ 0. If the 
day’s return is less than zero, we set the good news return on that day to zero. We next 
                                                          
4Timeliness is measured in calendar time, to facilitate international comparisons since the number of trading 
days in a year differs by country. Prices are forward-filled on days when the market was closed (e.g., on 
weekends and holidays), or when there was no trading in the stock. We set the ending date to be fourteen 
days after the earnings release date because the market may need time to absorb information (Beaver, 1968). 
The difference between our measure and Beekes and Brown’s (2006) is the 0.5 adjustment difference, which 
is a pure technical adjustment difference, and does not affect our results. As robustness checks, we estimate 
the timeliness measures using 0, 7, and 21 days lags and find similar results. 
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create a cumulative log return series, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺 , by setting 𝐶𝐶−365𝐺𝐺 = 0, and constructing the 
good news return series as 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1𝐺𝐺 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺 from day -365 to day -1. The timeliness of 
good news is thereby: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = ((∑ (𝐶𝐶0𝐺𝐺 − 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺)/𝐶𝐶0𝐺𝐺)/365𝑡𝑡=−1𝑡𝑡=−365                                                                         (2) 
The raw (unadjusted) returns are filtered at the third quartile to mitigate 
noise in identifying the nature of forward-looking information (e.g., form bid-ask 
bounce). We follow Beekes et al. (2014, 2016) and choose the third quartile as the filter. 
The information timeliness of bad news is defined in a similar fashion. Thus the 
imbalanced and optimistically biased information timeliness (IOBIT) is measured with 
the ratio of ITG divided by ITB. When the ratio equals to 1, it suggests that good and bad 
information is incorporated into share price in a similar timely manner, thus balanced 
information timeliness. When the ratio is below 1, it suggests that information timeliness 
is imbalanced and optimistically biased. An increasing ITG with a decreasing ITB, or a 
greater increase in ITG than in ITB, or a greater reduction in ITB than in ITG, can lead to 
an increase in IOBIT. Higher values of IOBIT indicate less optimistically biased 
information timeliness.  
IOBIT= ITG/ITB                                                                                                     (3)  
 
3.3. Measuring market-level financial integration 
Given market-level financial integration is a gradual and reversible process, we 
gauge financial integration at market levels via a de-jure measure as well as a more 
accurate de-facto measure with time-varying and regime-switching characteristics. De-
jure measures emphasize changes in policy and legal controls on cross- border capital 
flows. Capital controls take many forms, including controls on inflows versus controls on 
outflows, quantity controls versus price controls, or restrictions on foreign equity 
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holdings. The imposition/relaxation of these controls reflects the dynamics of a country’s 
financial market openness. We adopt the de-jure market-level financial integration index 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2006), labeled as DJFI in our study. The index, widely used 
in literature to capture market-level financial integration (e.g., Umutlu et al., 2010), aims 
at measuring the extent of openness in capital controls based on information in the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Higher values of the index indicate greater openness of a country to cross-border capital 
transactions.  
 However, various restrictions associated with foreign exchange transactions may 
not necessarily impede capital flows so that the actual degree of openness of the capital 
market and the de-facto market-level financial integration can be different from de-jure 
market-level financial integration. In addition, de-facto market-level financial integration 
can be more time-varying than the de-jure measure with less time-varying changes in 
policy and legal controls on cross- border capital flows. To measure de-facto time-
varying market-level financial integration (DFFI), we follow Baele and Inghelbrecht 
(2010) and adapt their estimation procedure to capture a price-based market-level 
financial integration measure.  
DFFI is estimated by taking the annual average of the weekly 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 estimates, which 
varies through time due to the change in economic and financial condition of an 
emerging market relative to the global market, it also exhibits regime-dependent 
behaviors according to business cycle in expansion or contraction. 
Specifically, we first extract global shocks using MSCI world index, and model its 
returns as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊,0 + 𝜸𝜸𝑊𝑊𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡−1𝑊𝑊 + 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡                                                                                           (4)  
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where 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1𝑊𝑊  is a vector of lagged variables consist of the MSCI global index return, the 
US 3-Month constant maturity treasury yield, the US 10-Year minus 3-Month constant 
maturity treasury yield spread, Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield minus 10-
Year constant maturity treasury yield spread, and the S&P 500 index dividend yield. The 
global shock is modelled by stochastic volatility model with its conditional variance 
generated by a regime-switching GJR-GARCH (1,1) process: 
𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡 ~ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡2 ) 
𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊,0�𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊,1�𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡�𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊,2�𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡−12  
              +𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊,3�𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡�𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡−12 𝐼𝐼�𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡−1<0�                                                                              (5) 
where 𝐼𝐼�𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡−1<0� is the indicator function, and 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡 is the latent regime variable. This 
specification closely mimics the empirical evidence that equity return volatility is 
stochastic, mean reverting, asymmetrical to positive and negative return shocks, and 
subject to multiple regimes.  
We then use MSCI indices to represent the financial market of a particular 
country, and decompose the market return 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 of country i at time t to its expected and 
unexpected components: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ~ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 � 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12  
                                                   +𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,3𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 𝐼𝐼�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1<0�                                 (6)  
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 denotes the expected return of country i at 𝑡𝑡 − 1, and is assumed to be a 
linear function in elements of 𝒁𝒁𝑡𝑡−1𝑊𝑊 , short rates and lagged MSCI index return of country 
i, and a constant. We assume that the unexpected return of country i consists of two 
elements: 1) country-specific financial market shock 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, and 2) financial market shock 
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due to global shock 𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊,𝑡𝑡. One can therefore interpret 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 as the time-varying sensitivity 
or exposure of country i’s financial market to the global financial market shocks. We 
therefore further assume that 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 takes the form: 
 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,0𝑊𝑊�𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1        𝑊𝑊                        (7) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the latent regime variable and 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑊𝑊  is a vector of structural variables 
that capture the economic and financial conditions of country i relative to global 
economy and financial market. We follow Baele and Inghelbrecht (2010), and use trade 
integration and sector misalignment as structural variables. Trade integration is 
calculated as the ratio of import and export over GDP, and sector misalignment is 
calculated by taking the square root to the sum of squared differences of relative industry 
composition between the world and a specific country. 
Using weekly returns, we first estimate the global shock by Gray (1996) filter, 
this is then used to estimate the regime-switching 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊 using Hamilton (1989) filter. To 
avoid local optimal and corner solutions, we conduct maximum likelihood estimation 
using a genetic algorithm assisted global search algorithm. The estimation procedure is 
conducted several times to ensure consistency.  
 
3.4. Measuring firm-level financial integration  
We measure firm-level financial integration via foreign ownership (FFIFO) and 
via cross-listing status (FFICL), following previous research (Werner & Kleidon, 1996; 
Mitton, 2006; Claessens & Schmuckler, 2007; Gozzi et al., 2010; Li et al., 2015). FFIFO 
is the shareholding held by foreign portfolio investors identified by Thomson Reuters 
Eikon. FFICL is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm’s shares are cross-listed and 
traded on a foreign stock exchange through Depository Receipts (DR), and zero 
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otherwise. Data on firms cross-listed on the U.S. exchange is obtained from the Bank of 
New York Mellon’s website. The dataset includes the name of the company issuing the 
DR, the DR’s trading symbol, the country in which the DRs are registered, the DR type, 
the primary exchange, the DR listing exchange and the effective date of issue. 
 
3.5. Measuring investor protection standards 
Following Nguyen et al. (2015) and Van Essen et al. (2013), we single out three 
indicators of national governance quality out of the six dimensional World Governance 
Indicators (WGIs), namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of 
law, to measure investor protection standard (IPS)5. These three indicators are found to be 
most related to firm operations (Nguyen et al., 2015; Van Essen et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 
2017). The indicators are displayed in standard normal units ranging from −2.5 to +2.5, 
with more positive values indicating better national governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). The indicators are highly correlated, hence, in line with Knudsen (2011), the three 
indicators are combined to form an aggregate national investor protection standard index, 
IPS = Government Effectiveness + Regulatory Quality + Rule of Law6.  
As suggested by prior literature (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Beekes et al., 2016), it is 
likely that the variation in information timeliness depends on market differences between 
                                                          
5 These World Governance Indicators (WGIs) are the most widely-used indicators in multi-country 
comparative studies (Nguyen et al., 2015; Van Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2011) and cover six 
dimensions of national governance quality including: voice and accountability; political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. 
According to Kaufmann et al. (2011, p. 4), the Government Effectiveness index captures “the quality of 
public services, the quality the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies”. The Regulatory Quality index captures “the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. The Rule of 
Law index captures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. 
6We also construct an alternative measure and use factor analysis to construct a proxy for investor protection 
standards by extracting the first principal component of the three above-mentioned indicators of national 
governance quality. The results remain robust. 
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countries. We include five variables to control for the economic, information, and 
institutional environment of a country. These variables, explained in more detail in Table 
1, include: the ratio of total value of stock traded over GDP (STOCKGDP); an 
information flow index (IFI); a dummy variable of legal origin coded 1 for firms from a 
country with Common Law tradition, and zero otherwise (COMMON); the annual 
percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI); and the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita (GDPPC). 
We also include six firm-level control variables which may affect information 
timeliness (Lev & Penham, 1990; Beekes & Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2014, 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2015). These variables, explained in more detail in Table 1, include firm 
size (SIZE), profitability (PROFIT), financial leverage (LEV), the ratio of book to 
market value to proxy growth opportunities (BM), volatility (VOL), and the structure of 
informational environment (SIE). 
 
3.6. Empirical Models 
To examine the effects of financial integration on information timeliness, we use the 
following regression models. Because we have time-invariant variables in our analysis, 
which prevent us from controlling firm level fixed effects, we include country, year and 
industry fixed-effects but address firm level fixed-effects by clustering standard error at a 
firm level.  
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                        (8)                                         
The subscripts i, c, s and t stand for firm, country, industry and year, respectively; 
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐, 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 and 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 are the country, industry and year dummy variables. T stands for 
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information timeliness related variables (i.e. IT, ITD, IOBIT, ITG or ITB). FINITI 
represents the financial integration related variables (i.e., DJFI, DFFI, FFIFO, or FFICL).   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
Figures 1 to 7 present the time series of our key variables from 1996 to 2016 for 
each of the 24 emerging markets. The overall trend for the value of information 
timeliness (deflated information timeliness) across all 24 markets is decreasing, as shown 
by the last graph, labeled as Total in Figure 1 (Figure 2). This indicates that information 
timeliness improves during the period of 1996-2016 in these emerging markets. 
However, the overall aggregate information timeliness can be imbalanced and 
optimistically biased in these emerging markets during the period, as revealed by the 
IOBIT shown in Figure 3 (which quite often can be below 1 during our sample period), 
in line with previous findings documented in the literature (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Zhang 
et al., 2015, 2017). There is significant variance of market-level financial integration in 
these emerging markets, as shown in Figure 4 and 5. Despite de-jure market-level 
financial integration remaining stable during 1996-2016 in a given market such as China 
and India, de-facto market-level financial integration is time-varying, indicating the 
importance of measuring market-level financial integration in these two different 
dimensions.  
Built on previous literature suggesting frontier markets show low integration with 
the world market through time (Berger et al., 2011), we find the frontier markets in our 
sample including Argentina, Jordan and Morocco show very unstable trends in their 
financial integration through time. Particularly, these frontier markets show decreasing 
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integration between 2005 to 2016, as revealed by Figure 5-A. In contrast, other emerging 
markets show a more stable and increasing integration trend through time. When we 
separate emerging markets into two groups, BRICS and non-BRICS groups, we find the 
increasing integration through time associated with emerging markets is largely driven 
by BRICS markets. However, financial integration level of BRICS markets drops to a 
much lower level in the last two years, 2015-2016, indicating de-facto market-level 
financial integration is reversing.  
There is a generally increasing trend for firms to become cross-listed in advanced 
markets during 1996-2016, as shown in the last graph, labeled Total, in Figure 5. Despite 
FFICL remaining stable during 1996-2016 in a given market such as Morocco (as shown 
in Figure 6), FFIFO is more dynamic and volatile, as shown in the last graph, labeled 
Total in Figure 7. Again this shows the importance of measuring firm-level financial 
integration in these two different dimensions.       
[Insert Figure 1-7 about here] 
Table 2 presents the statistics for our variables. Despite that, on average, IOBIT 
of a firm in our sample is insignificantly different from 1 (mean=1.013, SD=0.158). Most 
of firms in emerging markets can have significantly imbalanced and optimistically biased 
information timeliness. This is revealed by the positive skewness of IOBIT, which is 
0.524, suggesting that the IOBIT of most of the firms in our sample fall toward the lower 
side of the scale. Despite that DJFI is low (mean=-0.291, SD=1.121), DFFI seems to be 
high (mean=0.753, SD=0.219). On average, 3.31 percent of firms in our sample choose 
to cross-list their shares in advanced markets and foreign ownership is only 8.95 percent. 
In emerging markets, firm-level financial integration can be low, in line with previous 
research (Mitton, 2006; Zhang et al., 2017). Investor protection standards in emerging 
markets show low values (mean=0.791) with huge variances (SD=1.616) across them.    
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 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
The correlation coefficients of variables are provided in Table 3.  As Table 3 
shows, there is no high correlation among any two explanatory variables to be included 
in regression models. Thus multi-collinearity is not a major concern for our analysis. As 
shown in Table 3, IOBIT has a low and positive correlation with IT and ITD. This 
suggests that these are two independent dimensions of information environment in 
emerging markets. In other words, in emerging markets, it is important to investigate 
IOBIT to reveal the potential serious agency problems which are covered by a timely but 
optimistically biased information environment. The correlation analysis between market-
level and firm-level financial integration shows a very low correlation (absolute value of 
the correlation <0.1), suggesting that there are two almost independent dimensions of 
financial integration, i.e., a country or market-level opening decision is independent of a 
firm-level opening decision.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (8). The dependent variables in 
column 1-5 are information timeliness (IT), information timeliness deflated (ITD), 
imbalanced and optimistically biased information timeliness (IOBIT), information 
timeliness for good news (ITG) and information timeliness for bad news (ITB), 
respectively7.   
Regarding market-level financial integration, the de-jure market-level financial 
                                                          
7 Comparing the R square across these regression models, the lower R square in the models with IOBIT, ITG, 
and ITB as dependent variables, suggests IOBIT, ITG, and ITB have more uncertainty or unknown factors 
and thus are less predictable than aggregate information timeliness. However, the significant relationship 
between financial integration and these variables (IOBIT, ITG, and ITB) suggests financial integration, both 
market- and firm-level are important factors, explaining the imbalanced optimistically biased information 
timeliness in Emerging Markets. 
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integration (DJFI) is significantly and positively related to information timeliness (IT) 
(0.032, p<0.01) and deflated information timeliness (ITD) (0.023, p<0.01). The de-facto 
market-level financial integration (DFFI) is significantly and positively related to 
deflated information timeliness (ITD) (0.011, p<0.10) but not significantly related to 
information timeliness (IT). The results in general suggest a rejection of null hypothesis 
1 and indicate that market-level financial integration reduces information timeliness in 
emerging markets. This is because market-level financial integration delays information 
timeliness of bad news. This impact dominates over its potential impact in improving 
information timeliness of good news. Indeed, Table 4 Column 3 shows that DJFI and 
DFFI are negatively and significantly related to IOBIT (-0.101, p<0.01, and -0.028, 
p<0.01 respectively).   When we distinguish between information timeliness for different 
types of information, Table 4 Column 4 and 5 show that DJFI is negatively and 
significantly related to ITG (-0.08, p<0.01), and positively and significantly related to 
ITB (0.017, p<0.05).  DFFI is positively and significantly related to both ITG (0.046, 
p<0.01) and ITB (0.077, p<0.01). These results support our Hypothesis 2, and suggest 
that market-level financial integration stimulates global information asymmetry related 
agency problems and leads to more imbalanced optimistically biased information 
timeliness.  More specifically, DJFI has bigger impacts on increasing IOBIT than DFFI 
(effect size difference significant level p<0.01). This suggests that DJFI, rather than 
DFFI, is more likely to augment global information asymmetries between large and 
minority shareholders in emerging markets and affect good and bad information 
timeliness asymmetrically. Our results are in line with previous literature suggesting that 
large shareholders have strong incentives to extract private benefits by engaging in 
imbalanced information disclosure and communication (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009; 
Ferreira et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013, 2017). 
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Regarding firm-level financial integration, foreign ownership (FFIFO) has no 
significant effects on either IT or ITD. Cross-listing (FFICL) is significantly and 
negatively related to IT (-0.018, p<0.01) and ITD (-0.016, p<0.01). Contrary to market-
level financial integration, firm-level financial integration improves information 
timeliness. Thus, the null hypothesis 3 is rejected. These results suggest that firm-level 
financial integration has different impacts than market-level financial integration and it is 
the engagement of firm-level financial integration by a firm itself from emerging markets 
which positively improves the disclosure quality and information timeliness, in line 
previous research (Bae et al., 2012; Fang et al., 2015).   
As Table 4 Column 3 shows, both FFIFO and FFICL are significantly and 
positively related to IOBIT (0.015, P<0.01 and 0.012, P<0.01 respectively). Our 
hypothesis 4 is therefore fully supported. When we distinguish between information 
timeliness for different types of information, we find that FFIFO and FFICL are 
significantly and positively related to ITG (0.011, p<0.01 and 0.015, p<0.01 
respectively). FFIFO and FFICL are significantly and negatively related to ITB (-0.004, 
p<0.1 and -0.002, p<0.1 respectively). These results suggest that firm-level financial 
integration mitigates optimistically biased information timeliness. More specifically, 
firm-level financial integration reduces information timeliness for good news and 
improves information timeliness for bad news. The evidence suggests that firm-level 
financial integration mitigates information asymmetries between large and minority 
shareholders, in line with others (e.g., Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Bae et al., 
2012), and corrects the imbalanced optimistically biased information timeliness in 
emerging markets.  
Regarding investor protection standards (IPS), it is significantly and negatively related 
to IT (-0.154, p<0.01) and ITD (-0.139, p<0.01). Thus we reject our null hypothesis 6, and 
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accept that investor protection standards improve information timeliness in emerging markets. 
Moreover, investor protection standards (IPS) is significantly and positively related to IOBIT 
(0.109, p<0.01), which supports our hypothesis 7. When we further investigate information 
timeliness for different types of information, we find that investor protection standards 
(IPS) is significantly and negatively related to ITB (-0.085, p<0.01). These results 
suggest that better investor protection mitigates optimistically biased information 
timeliness mainly by ensuring bad information is communicated with investors in a more 
timely manner. Consistent with the literature, we find a disciplining effect of legal 
environment on corporate disclosure (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; 
Aslan & Kumar, 2014). 
Regarding the control variables, we only discuss the consistent outcome across all 
the tests. We find that IT and ITD are significantly and positively related to 
STOCKGDP, COMMON and IFI. The results suggest that stock market development, 
adopting British common law system, and better information flow have not helped 
emerging market firms to enhance information timeliness. Moreover, we find that IOBIT 
is significantly and negatively related to all five country-level control variables including 
STOCKGDP, COMMON, IFI, CPI and GDPPC. These results highlight the importance 
in understanding the factors in mitigating the generally imbalanced and optimistically 
biased information environment in many emerging markets (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; 
Khurana et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013, 2015, 2017; Ang & Ma, 2001). As for the 
effects of COMMON, it is in contrast with the impacts of investor protection standards 
(IPS). This suggests that it is the investor protection standard embedded in a law system 
rather than the simple common law origin that mitigates IOBIT and enhances investor 
protection outcomes in emerging markets. 
Regarding the firm-level control variables, we find that IT and ITD are 
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significantly and negatively related to SIZE, PROFIT and BM, while significantly and 
positively related to LEV, VOL and SIE. The results confirm previously documented 
evidences (e.g., Beekes & Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2014, 2016). Large companies 
have better information timeliness than small ones, confirming other evidences (e.g., 
Beekes & Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2014). Moreover, IOBIT is significantly and 
negatively related to SIZE and VOL, while significantly and positively related to 
PROFIT, LEV and BM. These results suggest the complexity of large companies in 
emerging markets facilitate large shareholder abuse of their forward-looking information 
advantages over minority shareholders to suppress more bad forward-looking 
information relative to good. Firm’s earnings (PROFIT) improve information timeliness 
and mitigate IOBIT, which suggests that more profitable firms are more transparent and 
less likely to engage in imbalanced and optimistically biased information communication 
with investors. Firms with high debt ratio (LEV) and high return uncertainty (VOL) have 
decreased information timeliness, but high debt level and return volatility mitigates 
IOBIT. These results suggest that debt-holders mitigate principal-principal conflicts 
whilst high uncertainty augments principle-principle conflicts, in line with previous 
research (Lucey & Zhang; 2011; Zhang et al., 2015). A firm with high book to market 
ratio (BM) has improved information timeliness and mitigated IOBIT. This suggests 
mature firms with low growth opportunities are more transparent in their prospects with 
fewer agency conflicts in extracting private benefits. A firm with a structure of 
information environment dominated by good information (SIE) reduces information 
timeliness, suggesting overall investors apply conservatism in incorporating positive 
information into price over the year, in line with previous research (e.g., LaFond & 
Watts, 2008; Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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4.3. Robustness tests 
In country-level studies, the primary issue is that countries may time their market 
opening decisions to correspond with windows of opportunity when overall market-level 
information timeliness is likely to improve anyway. Because we focus on firm-level 
information timeliness, with firm-level financial integration varying within countries, 
endogeneity that arises from countries timing the market-level financial integration 
decision is not a major concern. However, at the firm level it is possible that firms with 
some characteristics choose to engage in firm-level financial integration only when firms 
are ready to do so. Thus, some reverse causality could exist, in which case the impact of 
firm-level financial integration on information timeliness could be overstated. 
To address the endogeneity issue, we use mixed effects models. Traditional fixed 
effect panel regression models prevent us from including time-invariant variables which 
are common in our analysis. Mixed effects models, by effectively controlling for average 
firm-level characteristics, can address the endogeneity concerns arising from time-
invariant firm characteristics (McCulloch et al., 2008; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012)8, 
i.e. it is only possible certain types of firms to engage with firm-level financial 
integration. Because we also have firm-level control variables in our mixed effects 
models, these firm-level control variables can address the endogeneity concerns arising 
from time-varying characteristics, i.e. the concern that firms choose to engage in firm-
level financial integration only when they reach a stage of development that would be 
conducive to information timeliness improvements. Table 5 shows the results from the 
mixed effect model estimations. Our previous conclusions are unchanged.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                          
8We also use random effect panel regressions by adding country, industry and firm dummies. The results 
remain stable and robust.  
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Our sample covers the 2007-2008 global financial crisis period, which represents 
an exogenous event for us to investigate the relationship between financial integration 
and information timeliness. We therefore split our sample into normal period and Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) period and retest our results9. Table 6 Panel A reports the results 
for normal period and Panel B reports the results for GFC period. For simplicity and 
focus, we only report the results related to our market-level, firm-level financial 
integration and investor protection variables. Table 6 Column 3 shows, DJFI is 
significantly and negatively related to IOBIT in normal period while DFFI is 
significantly and negatively related to IOBIT in GFC period. As table 6 Colum 1 and 2 
show, DJFI is significantly and positively related to IT or ITD during normal period, but 
negatively related to ITD during GFC period. DFFI is insignificantly related to IT or ITD 
during normal period, but significantly and negatively related to IT or ITD during GFC 
period. Such change is largely due to the good forward-looking information timeliness 
during GFC can be communicated with investors in a timelier manner, as Table 6 Panel 
B Column 4 shows.  
Both FFICL and FFIFO is significantly and positively related to IOBIT in normal 
period and in GFC period, with a significantly bigger effect (effect size difference 
significant level p<0.01) in GFC period than in normal period.  
Investor protection is significantly and negatively related to the information 
timeliness for bad news (ITB) without affecting the information timeliness for good news 
(ITG) in normal period, but significantly and negatively related to both ITB and ITG in 
GFC period. These further investigation reveals that, compared their impacts on normal 
                                                          
9 Our sample also covers frontier markets, a subset of emerging markets, which may have different market 
level financial integration from other emerging markets (Berger et al, 2011). We therefore split our sample 
into frontier markets and other emerging markets. Our main results hold robust in non-frontier emerging 
markets only, suggesting frontier markets indeed, have different financial integration behavior from other 
emerging markets and our main conclusions do not hold in these sub-set frontier emerging markets. 
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period, the impacts of investor protection policies during financial crisis periods on 
correcting IBIOT are particularly driven by its more cautionary stance on good forward-
looking information communications with investors.  
These results taken together, suggest the GFC, as the exogenous shock to firms in 
emerging markets, augments large shareholders’ incentives to abuse their global 
information advantages from market-level financial integration, leading to more 
imbalanced and optimistically biased information timeliness. Thus firm-level financial 
integration and investor protection, as the mechanisms to mitigate agency problems, 
become more important to correct IOBIT, in line with our previous findings.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We use propensity score matching approach to address the issue of reverse causality 
caused by endogeneity between firm-level financial integration and firm-level information 
timeliness10. We create a Propensity Score Matched (PSM) sample by matching treated 
firms with those control firms based on nearest neighbour according to DJFI DFFI IPS 
STOCKGDP COMMON CPI GDPPC IFI SIZE PROFIT LEV BM VOL SIE and Industry. 
The additional robustness test results using the PSM sample are provided in Table 7. Our 
results remain stable and robust.  
 
4.4. Interaction tests 
In line with Mitton (2006) and Bekaert et al. (2005), another approach to check 
                                                          
10 Previous research commonly uses difference-in-differences (DID) test to address the reverse causality 
related endogeneity issue. However, DID needs a clear treatment group, a control group, and a treatment 
event to distinguish between pre-treatment period and post-treatment period. In our research, the treatment 
group is firms with foreign investors or cross-listing status. Given firm-level financial integration by having 
a foreign investor or cross-listing is a gradual, dynamic and reversible process, there is no single event to 
identify when a firm formally engages in firm-level financial integration. Without reliably identifying pre-
treatment periods for those treated firms with foreign investors or cross-listing status, it is not practical for 




causality is to employ firm-level information timeliness variation in the response to firm-
level financial integration under different exogenous conditions (such as market-level 
financial integration and investor protection standards in our study). Thus, if firm-level 
financial integration has a causal effect on information timeliness, then it should have a 
weaker impact on IT and ITD of firms that are subject to more severe principal-principal 
conflicts and/or have a reduced demand on foreign investors to mitigate principal-
principal conflicts. If, on the other hand, the causality runs in the other direction, then 
this cross-sectional pattern would not be predicted11. The above interaction effects are 
generalized as hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 8. 
Table 8 reports the interaction effects of firm-level financial integration (FFICL 
and FFIFO) with market-level financial integration (DJFI and DFFI) and with investor 
protection standard (IPS). In the tests, we include all main effects, and add the interaction 
term between firm-level financial integration and one of these market-level conditional 
variables (i.e., one of DJFI, DFFI and IPS). For simplicity and focus, we only report the 
results related to the interaction effects and the marginal effects of firm-level financial 
integration (FFICL and FFIFO) when DJFI, DFFI or IPS is at a low or high level. 
Following Brambor et al. (2006), we categorise the low (high) level of DJFI, DFFI or 
IPS when it is below (above) the average level in the sample.  
As Table 8 Panel A Column 3 shows, DJFI significantly and negatively interacts 
with both FFICL and FFIFO in affecting IOBIT. The marginal effects of FFICL are 
positive and significant at both low level (0.132, p<0.01) and high level (0.047, p<0.1) of 
DJFI. The marginal effects of FFIFO are positive and significant at both low level 
(0.059, p<0.01) and high level (0.028, p<0.01). These results suggest that both FFICL 
                                                          
11 As our additional robust check, we also use lagged variables as instrumental variables and run AB-GMM 
estimations. Results remain stable and robust.  
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and FFIFO have weaker impacts in mitigating IOBIT for firms in emerging markets 
when DJFI increases. Particularly, the interaction between DJFI and FFIFO is 
significantly negative, simultaneously in both information timeliness for good and bad 
news, as shown in Table 8 Panel A Column 4 and 5. This leads to weakened impacts of 
FFIFO in improving information timeliness, as shown in Table 8 Panel A Column 1 and 
2. DFFI does not have such moderation effects on firm-level financial integration in 
affecting information timeliness, suggesting that de-facto market-level financial 
integration is less likely than de-jure market-level financial integration to be abused by 
large shareholders in augmenting global information asymmetries and weakening the 
monitoring benefits of firm-level financial integration. Taken together, our hypothesis 5 
is supported.    
Table 8 Panel B shows that FFIFO significantly and negatively interacts with IPS 
in affecting IOBIT. Particularly, the marginal effects of FFIFO are positive and 
significant at both low level (0.056, p<0.01) and high level (0.033, p<0.01) of IPS. This 
suggests that FFIFO has smaller impacts in mitigating IOBIT for firms from where 
investor protection standards are stronger. The interaction between IPS and FFIFO is 
significantly negative, simultaneously in both information timeliness for good and bad 
news, as shown in Table 8 Panel B Column 4 and 5. This leads to weakened impacts of 
FFIFO in improving information timeliness, as shown in Table 8 Panel B Column 1 and 
2. IPS does not have such moderation effects on FFICL, suggesting that IPS is more 
likely to mitigate the global information advantages of foreign investors if the firm is not 
cross-listed in advanced markets and weaken the monitoring benefits of foreign investors 
in emerging markets. Taken together, our hypothesis 8 is supported. Overall, our 
evidence suggests that there are causal effects associated with firm-level financial 




[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Discussions and conclusions 
Balanced information timeliness by informing investors about the firm 
prospectus, is crucial for stock market efficiency and investor protection (Feldman et al., 
2010; Merkley, 2014). Emerging markets have different institutional environments to 
advanced markets so that information timeliness in many emerging markets can be 
imbalanced and biased towards good relative to bad. We examine the effects of financial 
integration and investor protection on information timeliness using 24 emerging markets 
during the period 1996-2016. We find that financial integration and investor protection 
quality do not necessarily affect aggregate information timeliness. But market-level 
financial integration augments IOBIT while firm-level financial integration and investor 
protection mitigate IOBIT. The effects of firm-level financial integration in mitigating 
IOBIT is mitigated when market-level financial integration increases and/or investor 
protection becomes stronger.  
Our results suggest agency conflicts may be the reasons that market-level financial 
integration does not necessarily lead to firm-level financial integration, in line with 
previous literature (Harvey, 1995; Kang & Stulz, 1997; Mitton, 2006; Claessens & 
Schmuckler, 2007; Li et al., 2015). By revealing the costs of market-level financial 
integration and benefits of firm-level financial integration in affecting information 
timeliness and IOBIT, our analysis has implications for regulators who aim to enhance 
benefits of financial integration and mitigate its costs.  
Regarding the debate on optimal bundle of governance mechanisms in mitigating 
agency costs (Aslan & Kumar, 2014), our research suggests that a firm which chooses to 
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respond to market-level openness by actively engaging with their own firm-level financial 
integration can signal their corporate governance quality to investors, enhancing the 
benefits associated with firm-level financial integration and reducing the agency costs 
associated with market-level financial openness. During the financial crisis period, such 
active engagement in firm-level financial integration is particularly important for investors 
to delink their firms’ information environment from others’, in line with Lee et al., (2016). 
However, it is not enough to exclusively rely on the arms-length monitoring of foreign 
investors, especially when the increasing market-level integration makes such monitoring 
service more costly. Our analysis also suggests that investor protection quality is important, 
especially in a financial crisis period, to set the right incentives for large shareholders in 
communicating information with investors, addressing the roots of agency problems and 
assuring investor confidence. By levelling the field for both domestic and foreign investors, 
investor protection standards gradually reduces the demand on the monitoring service 
offered by foreign investors in mitigating global information asymmetries.  
We focus on market-level and firm-level financial integration. Further research 
could also explore channels through which financial integration might affect the 
information timeliness in emerging markets. For example, has financial integration 
increased disclosure levels in terms of both the frequency and the amount of disclosure? 
Has financial integration increased the trading intensity from informed investors? These 
questions are important for us to understand the mechanisms via which financial 
integration can affect managerial disclosure decisions, information content of share price 
and price discovery efficiency in emerging markets.  
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Description Source 
Panel A: Timeliness variables 
IT (Information 
Timeliness) 




Information timeliness deflated. This measure is calculated by deflating the raw 
timeliness measure in Eq.(1) by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share 







Imbalanced, optimistically biased information timeliness, measured with the 




Timeliness for Good 
News) 
Information timeliness of good news, estimated as in Eq.(2). Datastream 
&Worldscope 
ITB (Information 
Timeliness for Bad 
News) 
Information timeliness of bad news, estimated as in Eq.(2). Datastream 
&Worldscope 




A country-level de-jure measure of openness in capital controls based on 
information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 




A country-level de-facto measure of financial integration gauging the 
interdependency between country and world equity index returns, with time-
varying and regime-switching characteristics.  
Federal Reserve 















A firm-level dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on a 
foreign exchange in that year and zero otherwise. 
Bank of New York 
Mellon 
Panel C: Investor protection standards 
IPS (Investor 
Protection Standard) 
Investor protection standards measurement, by singling out three indicators of 
national governance quality out of the six dimensional World Governance 
Indicators (WGIs), namely government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and 
the rule of law. IPS = Government Effectiveness + Regulatory Quality + Rule 





Panel D: Country-level control variables 
STOCKGDP (Stocks 
to GDP) 
The ratio of the total value of stocks traded on official stock exchanges in a 





Flow Index)  
Measured using data such as internet users (per 1,000 people), television (per 
1,000 people), and trade in newspapers (percentage of GDP). 





The annual percentage change in the consumer price index World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank, 2013) 
GDPPC (GDP Per 
Capita) 
The natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. World Development 
Indicators (World 
Bank,2013) 
COMMON  A dummy variable that is equal to one if the country adopts the British common La Porta et al. (1998) 
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law system and zero otherwise. 
Panel E: Firm-level control variables 
SIZE (Firm Size of 
Market 
Capitalization) 





Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (Worldscope item 18198) 
divided by total assets (Worldscope item02999). 
Worldscope 
LEV (Leverage) Total debt (Worldscope item 03255) divided by total assets. Worldscope 
BM (Book to 
Market Ratio) 
Total shareholder’s equity (Worldscope item 03995) divided by market 
capitalization (Worldscope item 08001). 
Worldscope 
VOL (Volatility) The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 360 days  Datastream 
SIE (Structure of 
Information 
Environment) 
A dummy variable captures the structure of information environment for a firm. 
SIE is equal to one if the firm outperforms the local market over the timeliness 






























Table 2. Summary statistics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean Median SD Min Max 
IT 110,583 0.219 0.219 0.166 0.0361 0.933 
ITD 110,583 0.152 0.152 0.0827 0.0340 0.430 
IOBIT 110,583 1.013 1.013 0.158 0.634 1.531 
ITG 110,583 0.496 0.496 0.0883 0.263 0.721 
ITB 110,583 0.494 0.494 0.0823 0.279 0.714 
DJFI 110,583 -0.291 -0.291 1.121 -1.202 2.360 
DFFI 110,583 0.753 0.753 0.219 0.225 1.142 
FFICL 110,583 0.0331 0.0331 0.179 0 1 
FFIFO 110,583 0.0895 0.0895 0.170 0 0.519 
IPS 110,583 0.709 0.031 1.616 -2.151 4.194 
STOCKGDP 110,583 0.741 0.741 0.660 0.0156 3.554 
IFI 110,583 70.41 70.41 12.01 48.69 89.81 
CPI 110,583 0.0467 0.0467 0.0404 -0.0118 0.232 
GDPPC 110,583 9.417 9.417 0.673 7.931 10.46 
COMMON 110,583 0.390 0.390 0.488 0 1 
SIZE 110,583 25.43 25.43 2.026 20.90 30.10 
PROFIT 110,583 0.0319 0.0319 0.0938 -0.404 0.288 
LEV 110,583 0.240 0.240 0.190 0 0.724 
BM 110,583 1.063 1.063 1.109 0.0506 6.549 
VOL 110,583 0.0265 0.0265 0.0118 0.00686 0.0734 
SIE 110,583 0.465 0.465 0.499 0 1 



























Note: this table reports the Pearson correlations between the timeliness and explanatory variables. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. All time varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Correlations bigger than 0.01 are 
significant at 1% level. 










































































IT 1.00                     
ITD 0.93 1.00                    
IOBIT 0.00 0.01 1.00                   
ITG 0.16 0.18 0.47 1.00                  
ITB 0.19 0.20 -0.39 0.60 1.00                 
DJFI 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00                
DFFI -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.24 1.00               
FFICL -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 1.00              
FFIFO -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.09 0.15 1.00             
IPS 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.39 -0.24 -0.05 -0.01 1.00            
STOCKGDP 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 0.32 -0.09 -0.18 0.13 1.00           
IFI 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.14 1.00          
CPI 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.07 0.08 0.14 -0.37 -0.32 -0.34 1.00         
GDPPC -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.59 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.58 0.22 0.68 -0.32 1.00        
COMMON 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.24 -0.51 0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.26 -0.37 0.09 -0.37 1.00       
SIZE -0.22 -0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.29 0.25 0.16 -0.17 0.26 -0.06 -0.09 0.04 -0.31 1.00      
PROFIT -0.21 -0.20 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.11 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14 0.09 -0.14 0.06 0.28 1.00     
LEV 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.03 -0.28 1.00    
BM 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.09 -0.16 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 -0.18 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.49 -0.16 0.07 1.00   
VOL 0.34 0.34 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.13 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.32 -0.26 0.09 0.13 1.00  






Table 4. The impacts of financial integration and investor protections on 
information timeliness  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IT ITD IOBIT ITG ITB 
DJFI 0.032*** 0.023*** -0.101*** -0.080*** 0.017** 
 (4.364) (3.086) (-12.826) (-10.174) (2.101) 
DFFI 0.001 0.011* -0.028*** 0.046*** 0.077*** 
 (0.080) (1.837) (-4.089) (7.489) (11.870) 
FFIFO 0.001 0.002 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.004* 
 (0.344) (0.573) (4.610) (3.447) (-1.705) 
FFICL -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.002* 
 (-5.615) (-5.045) (4.066) (5.907) (-1.709) 
IPS -0.154*** -0.139*** 0.109*** 0.013 -0.085*** 
 (-7.865) (-7.342) (5.354) (0.713) (-4.310) 
STOCKGDP 0.026*** 0.041*** -0.038*** -0.183*** -0.165*** 
 (5.480) (8.643) (-7.310) (-33.220) (-29.071) 
COMMON 0.112*** 0.056* -0.477*** -0.109*** 0.324*** 
 (3.653) (1.771) (-14.089) (-3.490) (10.332) 
IFI 0.090*** 0.051*** -0.128*** -0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (5.050) (2.923) (-7.200) (-3.731) (3.788) 
GDPPC 0.028 0.019 -0.301*** -0.032 0.219*** 
 (1.313) (0.858) (-13.019) (-1.508) (10.135) 
CPI 0.006 0.008* -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.020*** 
 (1.389) (1.738) (-3.891) (-7.528) (-4.137) 
SIZE -0.066*** -0.091*** -0.064*** -0.040*** 0.016*** 
 (-12.591) (-17.714) (-12.759) (-8.572) (3.508) 
PROFIT -0.135*** -0.120*** 0.008** -0.037*** -0.045*** 
 (-28.677) (-29.519) (2.240) (-10.449) (-12.455) 
LEV 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.006** 
 (4.501) (6.353) (4.973) (6.404) (1.994) 
BM -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.097*** 0.088*** -0.003 
 (-4.071) (-4.884) (24.265) (22.963) (-0.836) 
VOL 0.279*** 0.269*** -0.047*** -0.072*** -0.039*** 
 (60.122) (65.163) (-11.955) (-17.789) (-9.350) 
SIE 0.067*** 0.077*** 0.004 --- --- 
 (24.215) (26.704) (1.311)   
N 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 
Adj. R2 0.220 0.221 0.107 0.142 0.114 
F 194.976 248.968 96.502 167.856 119.797 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. For the regression model, please 
refer back to Equation 8 in our main text for details. The time invariant variables prevent us from controlling firm 
fixed effect directly, which is indirectly controlled by using standard errors clustered at a firm level. t statistics are 








Table 5. The impacts of financial integration and investor protections on 
information timeliness (Mixed effect models) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IT ITD IOBIT ITG ITB 
DJFI 0.034*** 0.023*** -0.098*** -0.081*** 0.012 
 (4.979) (3.394) (-12.861) (-10.980) (1.622) 
DFFI 0.001 0.007* -0.022*** 0.049*** 0.073*** 
 (1.193) (1.670) (-3.636) (8.198) (11.950) 
FFIFO -0.001 0.000 0.014*** 0.009*** -0.004* 
 (-0.179) (0.114) (4.293) (2.802) (-1.779) 
FFICL -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** -0.002* 
 (-4.419) (-4.261) (3.983) (4.892) (1.635) 
IPS -0.125*** -0.112*** 0.114*** 0.023 -0.088*** 
 (-8.282) (-7.351) (6.087) (1.324) (-4.818) 
STOCKGDP 0.029*** 0.043*** -0.040*** -0.184*** -0.161*** 
 (5.840) (8.755) (-7.287) (-34.785) (-29.530) 
COMMON 0.050** 0.022 -0.144** 0.039 0.159*** 
 (2.279) (0.983) (-2.056) (1.113) (3.164) 
IFI 0.090*** 0.050*** -0.113*** -0.057*** 0.055*** 
 (5.781) (3.216) (-6.453) (-3.407) (3.189) 
GDPPC -0.018 -0.012 -0.269*** -0.014 0.187*** 
 (-0.993) (-0.657) (-11.959) (-0.680) (8.540) 
CPI 0.007 0.008* -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.021*** 
 (1.513) (1.893) (-4.096) (-7.799) (-4.345) 
SIZE -0.071*** -0.099*** -0.066*** -0.041*** 0.015*** 
 (-14.120) (-19.913) (-13.954) (-8.905) (3.294) 
PROFIT -0.128*** -0.113*** 0.009*** -0.036*** -0.045*** 
 (-38.185) (-33.657) (2.600) (-10.740) (-13.235) 
LEV 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.005 
 (6.848) (8.677) (6.178) (7.082) (1.432) 
BM -0.014*** -0.016*** 0.105*** 0.094*** -0.004 
 (-3.723) (-4.398) (28.777) (26.586) (-1.060) 
VOL 0.257*** 0.247*** -0.048*** -0.074*** -0.039*** 
 (74.421) (71.898) (-13.351) (-21.099) (-10.943) 
SIE 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.005* --- --- 
 (25.438) (29.110) (1.649)   
N 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 
Chi2 11,905.879 11,840.892 2,376.153 3,821.260 1,474.759 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. For the regression model, please refer 
back to Equation 8 in our main text for details. Mixed effects combine fixed effect and random effects from year, country, 
industry and firm levels. z statistics are reported in parentheses. All time varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 








Table 6. The impacts of financial integration and investor protections on 
information timeliness (Normal vs Global Financial Crisis Period) 
Panel A Normal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IT ITD IOBIT ITG ITB 
DJFI 0.029*** 0.022*** -0.030*** -0.044*** -0.010 
 (3.563) (2.629) (-3.330) (-5.088) (-1.096) 
DFFI 0.006 -0.000 0.003 0.074*** 0.078*** 
 (0.898) (-0.051) (0.357) (10.936) (10.938) 
FFIFO -0.002 -0.001 0.014*** 0.007** -0.006** 
 (-0.589) (-0.245) (3.893) (2.158) (-1.992) 
FFICL -0.014*** -0.013*** 0.007** 0.014*** -0.006** 
 (-4.165) (-3.701) (2.142) (5.190) (-2.189) 
IPS -0.138*** -0.129*** 0.034* 0.044 -0.065*** 
 (-6.263) (-6.072) (1.661) (1.056) (-2.875) 
N 96922 96922 96922 96922 96922 
Adj. R2 0.167 0.169 0.109 0.124 0.098 
Panel B GFC (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DJFI -0.058 -0.132*** -0.074 -0.142** -0.103* 
 (-1.229) (-2.732) (-1.404) (-2.449) (-1.791) 
DFFI -0.236*** -0.272*** -0.523*** -0.166** 0.331*** 
 (-4.887) (-5.312) (-8.148) (-2.523) (4.657) 
FFIFO 0.020** 0.017* 0.017** 0.018** 0.005 
 (2.231) (1.886) (2.024) (2.024) (0.581) 
FFICL -0.042*** -0.038*** 0.027*** 0.018*** -0.010 
 (-6.145) (-5.264) (4.168) (2.650) (-1.429) 
IPS 0.496*** 0.596*** 1.160*** 0.260* -0.804*** 
 (3.808) (4.607) (8.996) (1.817) (-5.883) 
N 13,661 13,661 13,661 13,661 13,661 
Adj. R2 0.191 0.178 0.269 0.146 0.155 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. For the regression model, please refer 
back to Equation 8 in our main text for details. GFC is the period 2007-2008. Time invariant variables prevent us from 
controlling firm fixed effect directly, which is indirectly controlled by using standard errors clustered at a firm level. t 
statistics are reported in parentheses. All time varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Coefficients 
are standardised. For simplicity and focus, we only report the results related to our market-level, firm-level financial 















Table 7. The impacts of financial integration on information timeliness 
(Propensity Score Matched Sample Approach) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IT ITD IOBIT ITG ITB 
DJFI 0.057*** 0.065*** -0.133*** -0.106*** 0.026 
 (3.428) (3.920) (-6.743) (-5.521) (1.331) 
DFFI 0.006 -0.000 -0.012 0.060*** 0.084*** 
 (0.488) (-0.037) (-0.823) (4.140) (6.054) 
FFIFO 0.001 0.002 0.023*** 0.019*** -0.001 
 (0.181) (0.393) (3.471) (3.073) (-0.159) 
FFICL -0.021*** -0.019*** 0.017*** 0.011** -0.007 
 (-4.546) (-4.075) (3.122) (1.987) (-1.300) 
IPS -0.176*** -0.168*** 0.076* -0.001 -0.094** 
 (-4.658) (-4.570) (1.835) (-0.026) (-2.272) 
N 21,586 21,586 21,586 21,586 21,586 
Adj. R2 0.171 0.171 0.089 0.112 0.094 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. For the regression model, please refer 
back to Equation 8 in our main text for details. We create a Propensity Score Matched (PSM) sample by matching 
treated firms with those control firms based on nearest neighbour according to DJFI DFFI IPS STOCKGDP 
COMMON CPI GDPPC IFI SIZE PROFIT LEV BM VOL SIE and Industry. The time invariant variables prevent us 
to control firm fixed effect directly, which is indirectly controlled by using standard errors clustered at a firm level. t 
statistics are reported in parentheses. All time varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Coefficients 
are standardised. For simplicity and focus, we do not report the results related to those control variable and only report the 
























Table 8. Interaction effects of firm-level financial integration with market 
level financial integration and investor protection on information timeliness 
 IT ITD IOBIT ITG ITB 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DJFI*FFICL -0.025 -0.040 -0.085*** -0.023 -0.033 

























DJFI*FFIFO 0.025** 0.032*** -0.031** -0.065*** -0.045*** 

























DFFI*FFICL -0.029 -0.031 0.023 -0.023 -0.033 

























DFFI*FFIFO -0.077*** -0.075*** 0.009 0.022* 0.020 

























Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IPS*FFICL 0.060 0.053 -0.003 -0.016 -0.028 

























IPS*FFIFO 0.049*** 0.044*** -0.024* -0.055*** -0.037*** 

























N 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 110,583 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. See Table 1 for definitions of the variables. For the main effect regression model, 
please refer back to Equation 8 in our main text for details. In the interaction tests, we include all main effects, and add the 
interaction term between firm-level financial integration and one of these market-level conditional variables (i.e., one of DJFI, 
DFFI and IPS). For simplicity and focus, we only report the results related to the interaction effects and the marginal effects 
of firm-level financial integration (FFICL and FFIFO) when DJFI, DFFI or IPS is at a low or high level. Following Brambor 
et al. (2006), we categorise the low (high) level of DJFI, DFFI or IPS when it is below (above) the average level in the sample. 
The time invariant variables prevent us from controlling firm fixed effect directly, which is indirectly controlled by using 
standard errors clustered at a firm level. t statistics are reported in parentheses. All time varying variables are winsorized at the 





































































Graphs by Type of Emerging Markets
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